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SEARCH AND SEIZURE-Police Searches on Public
School Campuses in New Mexico-
State v. Tywayne H.
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Tywayne H. the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the lowered
standard of reasonable suspicion that the United States Supreme Court applied to
school officials in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 2 would not apply to police officers invited
onto a public school campus if the police officers conducted the search solely at
their own discretion.3 Thus, the court held that a police officer will be held to the
standard of probable cause4 for searches on public school campuses. Prior to
Tywayne H., New Mexico courts had not addressed the standard to which police
would be held when searching students on public school campuses. However, New
Mexico courts had already established a lowered standard for searches by public
school officials5 and applied the United States Supreme Court ruling that required
school officials to have a reasonable suspicion rather than a probable cause in order
to search students.6 This note explores how the New Mexico Court of Appeals
decided what standard of proof police must meet when conducting searches on
public school grounds, and discusses the implications the Tywayne H. decision will
have on such future searches. Part II sets out the facts in Tywayne H. Part III
addresses federal and state cases on which the Tywayne H. court relied in making
its decision. Part IV explains the Tywayne H. court's reasoning, which is analyzed
in part V. Finally, part VI discusses the implications of the Tywayne H. ruling for
New Mexico.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tywayne and a friend attended a dance held in the Clovis High School
gymnasium.7 That night, two Clovis Police Department officers, in uniform,
provided security for the dance. The dance started at approximately midnight, and
all students were told to enter the gym through the front entrance where they would
have their hands stamped. Students who left the gym were not permitted to return
to the dance. Shortly after the dance began, two officers arrived to check on the
officers already stationed at the school. At approximately 12:45 a.m., Tywayne and
his friend entered the gymnasium through a side door. An officer asked a school
coach who was present if students were allowed to enter through the side door, and
the coach told the officer that students were not. The four police officers then
entered the gym and surrounded Tywayne and his friend. An officer informed the
1. 123 N.M. 42,933 P.2d 251 (Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 83,934 P.2d 251 (1997).
2. 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
3. See TywayneH., 123 N.M. at45,933 P.2dat254.
4. "Probable cause is the existence of circumstances which would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe
in the guilt of an anested party. Mere suspicion or belief, unsupported by facts or circumstances, is insufficient."
State v. Jones, 435 P.2d 317, 319 (Or. 1967).
5. See State v. Michael G., 106 N.M. 644,646-48,748 P.2d 17, 19-21 (CL App. 1987).
6. See id. (discussing and applying New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985)).
7. See 7ywayne H., 123 N.M. 42,44,993 P.2d 251,253 (Ct. App. 1997). Unless otherwise noted, all facts
in this section are taken from Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at 44-45, 933 P.2d at 253-254.
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other officers that Tywayne' s friend smelled of alcohol. One officer smelled alcohol
on Tywayne, and Tywayne admitted to drinking a beer while he was outside. The
officers asked Tywayne and his friend to step outside. Once outside, the police
conducted a pat-down search of Tywayne and his friend. During the search of
Tywayne, an officer discovered that Tywayne carried a loaded semi-automatic
weapon. Despite the fact that Tywayne had a weapon, the officers noted that the
students fully cooperated at all times and did not show any violent tendencies
during the encounter. There were no school authorities present during the pat-down
search.
Following his arrest for possession of the semi-automatic weapon, Tywayne was
required to appear at a delinquency hearing at the district court in Curry County.
Prior to the hearing, Tywayne filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the seized
semi-automatic weapon, arguing that the search was unlawful.' The district judge
denied Tywayne's motion and adjudged Tywayne delinquent for unlawfully
carrying a deadly weapon on school premises.9 Tywayne appealed the denial of his
motion to suppress. The court of appeals agreed that the search was unlawful and
reversed the district court's decision. 0
III. BACKGROUND
Students' rights are limited, but "[s]chool children do not shed their constitu-
tional rights at the school house gate."11 However, on numerous occasions the
Supreme Court has ruled that students should not be afforded full constitutional
protections." "Although minors do receive the protections of the Constitution, the
scope of their rights is limited when compared to adult rights."' 3 According to the
Supreme Court, three reasons justify the lowered standard: "the peculiar vulnerabil-
ity of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child-rearing.""
In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court began limiting students' First, Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 5 The limits on those rights are not often
disputed any more, but "limitations on students' Fourth Amendment rights have
been brought to the forefront of controversy over the past few years."' 6 The
increased interest in students' Fourth Amendment rights, or the restraints thereon,
is based on the escalating fear of drugs and violence on public school campuses.1 7
8. See id. at 45, 933 P.2d at 254.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Id. (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
12. See Conin R. Stone, The Fourth Amendment in Public Schools: An Overview, 25 SEARCH & SEIZURE
L REP., 9 (1998).
13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979)).
15. See ld
16. Id.
17. See JANET R. PRIcE ET AL, THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A STUDENT'S
RIGHTS 80 (3d ed. 1988).
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The desire to protect students has inevitably led to a debate over the need to keep
drugs and weapons out of schools versus a student's right to privacy."
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that every person who has a reasonable
expectation of privacy is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusions.'9 Before 1985, students' Fourth Amendment rights on public school
campuses were governed either by the in loco parentis doctrine or a "reasonable
suspicion" test.' In some jurisdictions, courts found that school officials were not
bound by any Fourth Amendment restraints whatsoever because of the doctrine of
in loco parentis.21 According to the in loco parentis doctrine, "a parent may...
delegate part of his parental authority .... to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child;
who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent
committed to his charge,. . . that of restraint and correction, as may be
necessary ... ."22 Based on the doctrine of in loco parentis, courts have held that
when a school official searches a student, the school official was acting in place of
the parent rather than as a governmental official. Because the parent would not be
exercising governmental authority, neither would the school.23 Defects with the in
loco parentis doctrine caused it to fall into disrepute with legal commentators and
courts.24
In contrast to the in loco parentis doctrine, most courts applied a balancing test
to public school searches. 25 Those courts held that school officials could constitu-
tionally conduct a search of a student under their supervision if there was a
"quantum of evidence somewhat short of that which [was] needed for the usual
police search." Typically, school officials were required to establish a reasonable
suspicion in order to justify the search. 27 The goal of this balancing test was to
"adequately protect the student from arbitrary searches and seizures and give the
school officials enough leeway to fulfill their duties."'
18. See id
19. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
20. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.11(a)
& (b), at 802-807 (3d ed. 1996).
21. See id. at 803. See, e.g., R.C.M. v. State, 600 S.W.2d 552 (rex. App. 1983). In addition to using in loco
parentis to deprive students of Fourth Amendment rights, school officials asserted that the Fourth Amendment's
probable cause requirement only applied to law enforcement officers and that school children only have a minimal
expectation of privacy, which is not important enough to outweigh the government's interest in protecting school
property and maintaining order and discipline. The United States Supreme Court rejected both of these arguments
by determining that because school officials are public officials, they are subject to the Fourth Amendment. See
New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985). Further, the Court found that although students have a lowered
expectation of privacy, they do have an expectation of some privacy. See Stone, supra note 12, at 11.
22. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 803.
23. See Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. App. 1970).
24. See, e.g., Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 236-37 (E.D. Tex. 1980). "While the
doctrine of in loco parentis places the school teacher or employee in the role of a parent for some purposes, that
doctrine cannot transcend constitutional rights." Id.
25. See, e.g., id.; M. v. Bd. of Educ. Bull-Chatham Community Unif. Sch. Dist., 429 F. Supp. 288, 292
(S.D. 111. 1977).
26. LAFAVE, supra note 20, at 807.
27. See id.; see also Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 226 ("Some articuable facts which focus suspicion on specific
students must be demonstrated before any school search can be carried out.").
28. LAFAVE, supra, note 20, at 808 (quoting New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
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In 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided New Jersey v. T.L .,29 which
was the Court's first direct analysis of searches and seizures in public schools.' The
Court both granted students rights and imposed limitations on those rights.31 In
T.L.O., the Court expressly rejected the in loco parentis doctrine and adopted a
standard similar to the "reasonable suspicion" standard that had been followed by
the majority of courts.32 T.LO. involved two teenage girls who were smoking in a
bathroom in violation of school rules. They were caught and taken to the school
principal's office. T.L.O.'s friend admitted smoking cigarettes, but T.L.O. denied
that she had done anything wrong.3 The principal took T.L.O. into another office
and searched her purse. Dining the course of his search, the principal found a small
amount of marijuana and information that linked T.L.O. to marijuana dealing.
T.L.O. claimed that the principal's search was illegal.3 4 In addressing the case, the
Supreme Court struggled to "strike the balance between the schoolchild's legitimate
expectation of privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an
environment in which learning [could] take place."" The Court held that school
officials are acting as government officials when they conduct searches of students,
but that school officials do not have to obtain a warrant before searching a student
under their authority.36 The Court also determined that school officials would not
be held to the probable cause standard required of police officers, but rather to the
lesser standard of "reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search."37
The test to determine if a search is reasonable under all the circumstances requires
a two part inquiry: first, whether the action was justified at its inception, and
second, whether the search was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place."
The Court explained that the reasonableness standard they created would aid
teachers and administrators by allowing them to regulate their conduct according
to reason and common sense without the burden of learning the intricacies of
probable cause.39 The reasonableness standard would also help students by insuring
that their interest would be invaded no more than necessary to achieve the goal of
preserving order in schools.' The Court's intent was to create a standard that would
29. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
30. See Stone, supra note 12, at 10.
31. See iii atll.
32. See T.LO., 469 U.S. at 336-37 ("In carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions., school
officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the
parents' immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.").
33. See id. at 328.
34. See id. at 328-29.
35. Id. at 340.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 341.
38. See id. at 341-42 ("Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school
official will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn
up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will
be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and
not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.") (footnotes
omitted).
39. See id. at 343.
40. See id.
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"neither unduly burden the efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their
schools nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of schoolchildren."'"
The holding in T.LO. was limited to searches carried out by school officials acting
on their own authority. The Court explicitly refused to express an opinion on the
standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials with or
on behalf of the police. 42
In addition to T.L.O., the Supreme Court recently examined students' privacy
rights in the context of drug testing required for student athletes in Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton.43 In Acton, a student and his parents refused to sign a consent
form for the school to perform a drug test screening that it required for students
participating in school sports programs." After refusing to sign the form and being
denied the right to participate, the student sued the school district alleging that the
school's Student Athlete Drug Policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. In addressing the case, the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for
analyzing the reasonableness of a search.45 First, a court must weigh the "nature of
the privacy interest upon which the search... intrudes." Second, a court considers
"the character of the intrusion that is complained of."' 7 And finally, the court looks
at the "nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue .... and the
efficacy of the means for meeting it."4 The Court applied the three-part test and
held that the school's policy was reasonable and therefore constitutional because
student athletes had a decreased expectation of privacy, the drug search was
relatively unobtrusive, and there was a severe need for the search.49
The New Mexico constitutional equivalent to the Fourth Amendment is Article
H, section 10: searches and seizures, which states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no wan-ant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched or
the persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable
cause, supported by an oath or affimation °
"The protections accorded under Article II, section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures are more extensive than
those provided under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution."'"
41. Id.
42. See id. at n.7.
43. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
44. See id. at 651.
45. See id. at 654-64.
46. Id. at 654.
47. Id. at 658.
48. Id. at 660.
49. See id. at 664-65.
50. N.M. CONST. art. II § 10.
51. In re Shon, Daniel K., 125 N.M. 219, 222, 959 P.2d 553, 556 (Ct. App. 1998); see also Campos v.
State, 117 N.M. 155, 158, 870 P.2d 117, 120 (1994) (noting that the state constitution imposes heightened probable
cause requirement); State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 149-50, 870 P.2d 103, 111-112 (1994) (holding that the
"knock and announce" requirement is implicit in state constitutional search and seizure provision); State v.
Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 446-47, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067-68 (1993) (holding federal "good faith" exception
incompatible with provisions of state constitution); State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211,217, 784 P.2d 30, 36 (1989)
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New Mexico law on searches of students on public school campuses began with
Doe v. State.52 Doe involved a group of students who were smoking a pipe
containing marijuana on campus. After being informed that the group had been
smoking marijuana on campus, the vice-principal confronted Doe and made him
surrender the pipe.53 A court judged Doe a delinquent, and he appealed based on,
inter alia, the claim that the search was illegal.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals determined that the Fourth Amendment
applied to the situation because the "action by a public school official [was] 'state
action', rendering the Fourth Amendment applicable through the Fourteenth." 4 In
addition, the court noted that the Fourth Amendment only protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and that "[the Fourth Amendment right of
persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures has been expressly
applied to juvenile proceedings . . . ."" Although the court recognized that
government officials are ordinarily held to a very high standard of reasonableness,
the court adopted "the standard that school officials may conduct a search of a
student's person if they have a reasonable suspicion that a crime is being or has
been committed or they have reasonable cause to believe that the search is
necessary in the name of maintaining school discipline."' To aid in the implementa-
tion of the new standard, the court identified factors to consider in determining
whether there is reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary. The factors
include the student's age, the. student's history and record in the school, the
prevalence of the problem in the school to which the search is addressed, the need
to make the search without delay, and the probative value and reliability of the
information used to justify the search. 7 The Doe court intended that the standard
created "by balancing the privacy rights of students against the unique administra-
tive responsibilities of the school officials"' would protect students from arbitrary
searches and allow the school officials the latitude they need to conduct searches
as part of their duties.59 According to Doe, requiring school officials to meet the
warrant requirement when conducting school searches would force the school to
request the help of the police for even a trivial search.' The court mainly attributed
the need for a lower standard to "[tihe realities of [the] school situation. 61
(finding "totality of the circumstances" test for determining existence of probable cause for issuance of a search
warrant incompatible with state constitutional safeguards).
52. 88 N.M. 347,540 P.2d 827 (Ct. App. 1975). This case was one of a handful cited by the United States
Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.LO. for the proposition that the lowered standard for school officials is based
on the need to balance the needs of the school to control conduct and the student's right to privacy. See T.L 0., 469
U.S. at 334 n. 11.
53. See Doe, 88 N.M. at 350, 540 P.2d at 830.
54. Id. at 351,540 P.2d at 831.
55. See id
56. Id. at 352, 540 P.2d at 832.
57. See id
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id. The court also attributed the need for a lower standard to "common sense and the increasing weight
of judicial decisions." Id The realities the schools were facing included a need to maintain essential ordinary school
discipline and the need to control crime, which was reaching epidemic proportions. See id.
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Twelve years after its decision in Doe, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
revisited the issue of searches on public school campuses in State v. Michael G.62
In Michael G., a student observed a fellow student selling marijuana and anony-
mously reported him to the school's swimming coach. The coach reported the
student to the school's assistant principals. The principals confronted the student
who was allegedly selling marijuana and searched his locker.63 After finding two
cigarettes that looked like marijuana, the principals called the police and had the
cigarettes tested. The cigarettes tested positive for marijuana. Based on the finding
of marijuana, the state petitioned to revoke the student's probation." The student
appealed, claiming that the marijuana was "the fruit of an unreasonable search that
violated the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and [Article II
Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution]."'65 In analyzing the student's claim,
the court began by applying the T.L 0. rule that "[a] search of a student is justified
in its inception if reasonable grounds exist to suspect that the search will uncover
evidence of violations of law or school rules."' The court stated that the question
it must answer was "whether, prior to the discovery of the marijuana, the assistant
principals had reasonable grounds to suspect that [the student] was violating the law
or school rules."'67 The student asserted that in order for the court to properly
analyze the case according to TLO., it must apply the factors established in Doe.6"
The State claimed that TLO. had "rejected the application of such stringent factors
and, in so doing, rendered the Doe opinion ineffective."'69 The court took a middle
ground between the two positions and found that:
[The Doe factors cannot be mechanically applied to determine whether a school
search was justified. Thus the absence of consideration of one or more of those
factors will not automatically lead to a finding that reasonable grounds for the
search did not exist. On the other hand, the Doe factors provide a useful guide
in determining whether a school search was reasonable under the fourth
amendment.70
After making this statement, the only factor that the court considered in analyzing
the case was the probative value and reliability of the information used to justify the
62. 106 N.M. 644,748 P.2d 17 (Ct. App. 1987).
63. See id. at 645, 748 P.2d at 18.
64. See id
65. Id.
66. Id. at 646, 748 P.2d at 19 (quoting New Jersey v. T.LO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985)). The court noted that
T.L O. "did not address the question of whether students have a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers, desks,
or other school property provided for storage of their belongings." Id. After briefly analyzing other court cases
addressing the issue, the court held that T.LO.'s standard applied to searches of students and their lockers. See id.
67. Id.
68. See id. According to Doe, the factors a court should consider include the child's age and history of
disciplinary problems; the prevalence and seriousness in the school of the problem at which the search is directed;
the exigency to make the search without delay; and the probative value and reliability of the information used to
justify the search. See Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 352, 540 P.2d 827, 832 (Ct. App. 1975).
69. Michael G., 106 N.M. at 646,748 P.2d at 19. T.LO. analyzed a New Jersey case in which the New
Jersey Supreme Court had applied a reasonable grounds test that included the same factors as those set out in Doe.
Although the United States Supreme Court in T.LO. stated that the New Jersey test was not substantially different
from its own, the Supreme Court did not apply the New Jersey court's factors, but instead applied a "totality of the
circumstances" type of test. See id.
70. Michael G. 106 N.M. at 647, 748 P.2d at 20.
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search.71 Based on its analysis, the court found that there were reasonable grounds
for the search, and therefore that there was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution or Article I1 section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution.72
IV. RATIONALE
The Tywayne H. court held that the police would not be held to the same lowered
standard of reasonable suspicion that applied to school officials.73 In reaching its
decision, the court began by analyzing the Fourth Amendment rights of school
children.74 The court found that "all persons harboring a reasonable expectation of
privacy are entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions.""
Despite the State's argument that school children did not harbor a reasonable
expectation of privacy and therefore the Fourth Amendment would not apply to
them, the court noted that "school children do not shed their constitutional rights at
the school house gate,"76 and found that case law demonstrates that the Fourth
Amendment applies to searches conducted in schools by public school officials.77
Dismissing the State's argument that the search was a legitimate school search
permitted by T.L.O., the court determined that T.LO.'s reason for lowering the
standard for school authorities was based upon a need to balance the school's
interest in discipline and order against the student's right to privacy.7" It also found
that the T.L.O. court limited its holding to school authorities acting alone and on
their own authority.79 Based on the fact that the only police contact with a school
official in Tywayne H.'s case was an officer's question to the coach about whether
the students could use the side door, and the fact that the coach's answer to the
officers did not constitute an instruction to search the students, the court found that
the search was not conducted by school authorities or at the request of school
authorities, but rather completely at the police officers' discretion 0 Tywayne H.
concluded that the reasonable suspicion standard did not apply to police acting on
their own discretion. Thus, the police required probable cause to search students.8"
71. See id. The court focused on the fact that the information that gave rise to the search was a student's
specific statement that another student had tried to sell him marijuana. It noted that the student's statement was
not based on mere rumor or belief but on an eyewitness account. The court then analogized the student's statement
to that of a citizen-informant and found that because the student was an eyewitness to the crime, his statement as
relayed to the principals provided reasonable grounds for the reasonable suspicion necessary for a school search.
See id.
72. See id. at 648, 748 P.2d at 21.
73. See Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at 45, 933 P.2d at 253.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 44, 933 P.2d at 253 (citing Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)).
76. See Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at44, 933 P.2d at 253 (citing Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 655-656 (1995)); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
77. See Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at 44,933 P.2d at 254.
78. See id.
79. See id
80. See id.
81. See id.; see also, Picha v. Wieglos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (N.D. M. 1976) (stating that probable cause
is required for a search which involves the police); F.P. v. State, 528 So.2d 1253, 1254-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (applying lowered standard of reasonable suspicion if the police are not involved).
[Vol. 30
STATE V. TYWAYNE H.
The court supported its decision by applying the Acton three-prong test 2 to
determine whether the facts in this case allowed a departure from the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause standard. 3 Regarding the first prong of the test, the
nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes, the court found that
"although ... [a student's] reasonable expectation of privacy is lowered with
respect to a search by school authorities .... it is not lowered with respect to a
search by a uniformed police officer."" According to Tywayne H., the court's
reasoning was in accordance with T.LO. because T.LO. based the lowered standard
of reasonable suspicion on the importance of preserving the informality of the
student-teacher relationship and on the belief that school officials need flexibility
in disciplinary measures in order to maintain security and order.8 5 As to this prong,
the court decided that based on the fact that a "school child's expectation of privacy
vis-a-vis the State as police officer, even a police liaison officer, is not diminished
simply because the child is at school," 6 the proper standard for a police search was
probable cause.
The Tywayne H. court decided that the second prong, the character of the
intrusion, also showed that probable cause was the proper standard to apply in this
case. It reasoned that "a pat-down search is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of
the person,"" and that "there is a sharp distinction between the purpose of a search
by a school official and a search by a police officer."88 Tywayne H. found that the
purpose of a school authority's search is to maintain discipline and order, but the
nature of a police search is to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution. 9 Thus, the
police search "involves a more substantial invasion of privacy than a search for
other purposes," 9 and should require probable cause.
In analyzing the final prong, the nature and immediacy of the search, the court
determined that although ridding public school grounds of weapons is a substantial
governmental interest, it is, at least to a degree, being addressed in that school
authorities can search students using the lowered standard of reasonable suspicion.91
Based on a student's "undiminished privacy interests ... with respect to a police
officer, combined with the character of the intrusive police search,"' the court
found that the final prong required a probable cause standard.
82. See Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653-60 (1995). The test requires that the
state's and the individual's conflicting intexests be "examined in light of (1) the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the search intrudes, (2) the character of the intrusion, (3) the nature and the immediacy of the search. Id.
83. See Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at 46, 933 P.2d at 255.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id. (quoting People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 326 (Mll. 1996)).
87. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)).
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. lt (quoting People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310,327 (111. 1996)); see also Acton, 515 U.S. at 658 n.2.
91. See Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at 46, 933 P.2d at 255.
92. Id.
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V. ANALYSIS
In Tywayne H.,93 the New Mexico Court of Appeals correctly declined to extend
T.L.0's holding to police officers acting on their own discretion.94 The court's
holding is consistent with the intent of both the New Mexico law on school searches
and the intent behind the United States Supreme Court's ruling in TLO. In both the
Supreme Court and New Mexico rulings, the intent was to balance the privacy
interests of school children against the special needs of school officials to maintain
discipline and protect students.95 Allowing police acting on their own discretion to
search students using the lowered standard would not promote the balancing goals
enunciated in T.L.O. and Doe.
The Tywayne H. court correctly determined that school officials and police
officers acting on their own initiative must meet different standards of suspicion
before conducting a search of a student. The Court's most earnest articulation of the
need for the different standards is shown in its quoting of Justice Powell's
concurrence in T.L.O.:
The special relationship between teacher and student ... distinguishes the
setting within which schoolchildren operate. Law enforcement officers function
as adversaries of criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and
to facilitate the charging and bringing of such persons to trial. Rarely does this
type of adversarial relationship exist between school authorities and pupils.
Instead there is a commonality of interests between teachers and their pupils.
The attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal responsibility for the
student's welfare as well as for his education.9
Prior to Tywayne H., no Supreme Court or New Mexico court cases had
determined what standard police would be held to when searching students on
public school campuses. A holding in Tywayne H. that would have extended the
lowered standard of reasonable suspicion to police officers would have been
unjustified by any prior case law or the discernable intent of T.L.O., Doe, or
Michael G.
The Tywayne H. court's fidelity to the intent behind prior cases strengthened, or
at the very least protected, student's privacy rights. In answer to the State's claim
"that school children do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy," 97 the court
clearly enunciated that T.L.O., Vernonia, Tinker, Doe, and Michael G. support a
finding that school children do have privacy expectations, even though the
expectations are "lowered with respect to a search by school authorities."98 Based
on the weight of previous case law, it would have been erroneous for the court to
agree with the State's contention concerning student's expectations of privacy.
93. Seeid. at 42,933 P.2d at 251.
94. See id at 45, 933 P.2d at 254 (stating that T.LO. had limited its application to school authorities acting
on their own authority).
95. See New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
96. Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at 46,933 P.2d at 255 (quoting New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 349-50
(1985)).
97. Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at 45, 933 P.2d at 255.
98. See id. at 46, 933 P.2d at 256.
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In analyzing whether the police search was justified as a T.L.O. search, the
Tywayne court decided the issue by strictly following T.L.O.'s limited "application
to school authorities acting alone and on their own authority."" The court did not
define who qualifies as a "school authority," but in applying this standard, the court
properly found that the discretionary police search did not fall within the
requirements of school authorities acting alone and on their own authority."° Had
the court found that police qualify as "a school authority," the door would have
been opened for the police to circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment's warrant and probable cause requirements whenever they conducted a search
at a public school.
Although the court appeared to decide the issue based solely on the fact that the
police were not school officials acting on their own authority, it supported its
decision using the three-part test established in Acton to determine whether a
departure from the Fourth Amendment standard of probable cause and a warrant
was appropriate.101 The court's application of the Acton three-part test implies that
it could have found that the police search of Tywayne would not have been justified
under either T.LO. or Acton. Although the court applied the Acton test, it did so
after it had already found that the police search violated T.L.O. The court never
explicitly stated whether New Mexico courts should apply Acton in order to
determine if departure from the probable cause standard is appropriate.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Tywayne H. correctly determined the standard police will be held to for searches
if they are acting solely at their own discretion, but it did not address three very
important issues: (1) the standard police will be held to when they are acting at the
behest of a school official; (2) whether police can direct school officials to institute
a search of a student when the police officer does not have probable cause; and (3)
to what standard a police liaison officer will be held while working at a public
school.
The first question is what standard will apply when school officials request that
the police conduct a search. It appears from Tywayne H. that the police would be
held to the lowered standard of reasonable suspicion. In Tywayne H., the court
noted that although the school's coach had answered the police officer's question
about whether students could enter the gym through a side door, he did not direct
the officers to search the students.' Because the coach did not direct the police
officers, the court found that the officers acted solely at their own discretion. °3 It
99. TLO., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7. Although Tywayne H. briefly explained T.LO's two-part test dealing with
whether the school authority's action was justified at its inception and whether the search was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference, it did not explicitly apply TLO's two-part test in
reaching its decision.
100. See Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at 45, 933 P.2d at 254("he only police contact with a school official was
officer Mondragon's question to the coach concerning whether students were permitted to enter through the side
door. The coach... gave no directive to the officers to search the students. During the pat down search... there
were no school authorities present.").
101. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 653.
102. See Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at 45, 933 P.2d at 254.
103. See id.
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follows that if the coach had directed the police to search the students, then the
court would have found that the police were not acting solely at their own
discretion, but rather at the behest of a school official. The court explicitly reserved
judgement as to what standard would apply in this situation. 'I However, the narrow
holding that a police officer acting solely at his or her own discretion will not be
held to the lowered reasonable suspicion standard indicates that if the officer was
acting at the direction of a school official, the police officer would be held to the
lowered reasonable suspicion standard.
It is likely that in the future a New Mexico court would hold a police officer to
the lowered standard of reasonable suspicion because a school official had asked
the officer to conduct the search. However, such a holding would be a mistake. If
a New Mexico court is asked to address this question, it should hold the officer to
the standard of probable cause. There are two reasons that the probable cause
standard should apply to police officers who conduct searches in schools.
First, New Mexico applies a lowered search standard to school officials in order
to balance the school officials' need to maintain order and discipline on the school
grounds with the students' privacy rights."°5 This careful balancing is required
because of the special relationship between school officials and students. Second,
a school official should not be able to transfer the lowered search standard to a
police officer simply because he or she requests that the police officer conduct the
search.
If a school official has a reasonable suspicion that a student is breaking the law
or violating a school rule, the official should conduct the search. However, if the
official believes that he or she cannot safely conduct the search and instructs the
police to search the student, the police officer should have to determine, based on
the information the school officials give him and any other information he gains,
that there is probable cause to search the student. Without probable cause or an
exception to the probable cause standard, the police should not conduct a search.
A police officer does not have the same relationship with a student that a school
official does and should not be held to a lowered standard for a search just because
it will occur on a school campus.
The next question that must be addressed is whether police can instruct school
officials to conduct a search. Tywayne H. found that the police search was
undertaken completely at the officer's discretion, and that "the search was not
conducted by school authorities on their own initiative or even by school authorities
with or at the direction of a law enforcement agency."'" The court's discussion of
the fact that the search was not with or at the direction of police implies that the
police could direct a school official to search a student. The court explicitly stated
that "[w]e, like the court in T.L.O., need not decide the standard for searches by
school authorities in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement
agencies. ' t67
104. See id. at 46-47, 933 P.2d at 255-256.
105. Seeid. at 46, 933 P.2d at 255.
106. Id. at 45, 933 P.2d at 254.107. Id. at 47, 933 P.2d at 256.
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This unanswered question leaves an open door for police to abuse their ability
to direct school officials to conduct a search. If police could direct school officials
to conduct a search, it would be possible for them to circumvent the requirement
that police officers have probable cause in order to conduct a search. For instance,
a police officer on a public school campus who witnesses a student engaged in what
he or she considers suspicious behavior could request that a school football coach
search the student. The police officer lacks probable cause, no crime has been
committed and there is no reason to believe that a crime is imminent. The officer
only has a feeling. Would a school official be obliged to follow the officer's
directions? The answer is unclear, but an official should be prohibited from
following the police officer's instruction. Allowing police officers to direct school
officials to search students could permit rampant abuse and allow circumvention
of the probable cause requirement. In the future, New Mexico courts should
determine that police cannot circumvent their probable cause requirement by
requesting a school official to conduct a search.
The final question is to what standard a police liaison officer will be held in
conducting a search on a public school campus. Police liaison officers are police
officers who are assigned to schools. They have all of the duties, powers, and
responsibilities of a regular police officer who patrols the streets. Tywayne H. does
not explicitly address what standard applies to police liaison officers, but the court's
opinion provides clues as to what standard the court may select in the future. The
first clues are found in the cases that the court cites in support of its decision
holding that police should conform to the probable cause standard. In reaching its
decision, the court approvingly cited cases that require a probable cause standard
for a search in which the police are involved.' °8 In addition to citing cases that
explicitly state that the lowered standard of suspicion applies only if there is no
police involvement, the court cites an authority that indicates that the police will be
held to the lowered standard of reasonable suspicion if they are only minimally
involved."° These clues appear to indicate that in the future the court may allow the
lowered standard to apply to police liaison officers if they are only minimally
involved in a search. Additionally, the court uses the introductory signals "But cf."
and "but see""' to introduce cases which support the proposition that police liaison
officers will always be held to the lowered standard."' Using these introductory
108. See Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (N.D. 11. 1976) (holding probable cause required if
police involved in school search); see also F.P. v. State, 528 So.2d 1253, 1254-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(probable cause required if police involved in school search); State v. Young, 216 S.E.2d 586, 594 (Ga. 1975)
(holding minimal standard of suspicion for school authorities applies if search is "free of involvement by law
enforcement personnel"); People v. Bowers, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432, 435 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (holding minimal standard
of suspicion applies to school authorities if search is free of police involvement).
109. See Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at 45, 933 P.2d at 254 (quoting I.AFAVE, supra note 20, at 832) ("Lower
courts have held or suggested that the usual probable cause test obtains if the police are involved in the search in
a significant way.")
110. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OFCrrATION 123 (Columbia Law Review et al., eds., 16th
ed. 1996). "But see" indicates that the cited authority directly states or clearly supports a proposition contrary to
the main proposition. It is used where "see" would be used for support. "But cf." is used when the cited authority
supports a proposition analogous to the contrary of the main position.
111. See Carson v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 192-93 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a search by plain-clothes liaison
officer in conjunction with vice-principal where officer's intrusion was minimal held to TLO. standard of
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signals to introduce these cases implies that the court did not approve of cases
which indicated that liaison officers should always be held to the lowered standard
of reasonable suspicion.
The next clue can be found in the Tywayne H. court's Acton analysis. In
addressing the second prong of Acton the court states "[w]e also believe that 'a
school child's expectation of privacy vis-a-vis the State as police officer, even a
police liaison officer, is not diminished simply because the child is at school.""'
The court does not state that a school child's expectation of privacy vis-a-vis the
police liaison officer requires that the police liaison officer be held to the probable
cause standard, but it implies that a school child retains the same expectation of
privacy when dealing with a police liaison officer that the child has when she is
dealing with any other police officer.
Although these hints may provide some insight into what the court may do,
whatever light these clues may shed is clouded by the court's disclaimer explicitly
stating that it was not providing an opinion as to the "standard for searches by
school authorities in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement
agencies.'. 3 When the question arises in the future, prudent policy dictates that the
court find that police liaison officers will be held to the probable cause requirement.
Although a police liaison officer would have a closer relationship with students than
a regular police official, the fact remains that liaison officers are on-duty, full-time
police officer's assigned to a school. They are not teachers. They are not school
officials. They are police officers and they should be held to the probable cause
standard.
VII. CONCLUSION
State of New Mexico v. Tywayne H. was New Mexico's first look at the standard
to which police will be held when searching students on public school campuses.
In its decision, the court clearly announced that police officers will be held to the
probable cause standard when they are searching a student completely at their own
discretion. The decision properly insured that only school officials would be able
to conduct searches of students using the lowered reasonable suspicion standard. In
the not too distant future, New Mexico will face further questions about whether to
extend the reasonable suspicion standard to police acting as liaison officers or at the
request of school officials. When faced with these questions, New Mexico courts
should continue to act in ways that protect students' privacy rights and find that
police cannot circumvent the Fourth Amendment or Article II section 10 of the New
Mexico Constitution.
MICHAEL DOYLE
reasonable suspicion); People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E. 2d at 317 (L 1996) (search by police officer acting in capacity
as liaison officer for public school governed by T.LO.).
112. Tywayne H., 123 N.M. at 46, 933 P.2d at 255 (quoting People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E. 2d 310, 326
(Nickels, J., dissenting)).
113. Seeid. at 47, 933 P.2d at 256.
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